Is Employment Globalizing? by Chen, Liming et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
International Publications Key Workplace Documents 
9-2018 
Is Employment Globalizing? 
Liming Chen 
Nankai University 
Jesus Felipe 
Asian Development Bank 
Andrew J. Y. Kam 
National University of Malaysia 
Aashish Mehta 
University of California at Santa Barbara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Is Employment Globalizing? 
Abstract 
We investigate the claim that national labor markets have become more globally interconnected in recent 
decades. We do so by deriving estimates over time of three different notions of interconnection: (i) the 
share of labor demand that is export induced (i.e., all labor demand created by foreign entities buying 
products exported by the home country)—we provide estimates for 40 countries; (ii) the share of workers 
employed in sectors producing tradable goods or services—68 countries; and (iii) the ratio of the number 
of jobs that are either located in a tradable sector, or that are involved in producing services that are 
required by these tradable sectors, to all jobs in the economy, which we call the trade-linked employment 
share—40 countries. Our estimates lead to the conclusion that the evidence of a large increase in the 
interconnections between national labor markets is far weaker than commonly asserted: levels of 
interconnectivity, and the direction of changes over time, vary across notions of interconnection and 
countries. The main reasons for this are labor- displacing productivity growth in tradable sectors of each 
economy and the diminishing fraction of national labor forces hired into manufacturing jobs worldwide. 
We also discuss the implications of our results for different policy debates that each of the three 
measures is associated with: international coordination of macroeconomic policies (export-induced labor 
demand), currency devaluations (share of workers producing tradables), and education and labor 
protection (trade-linked share). 
Keywords 
employment, export induced, globalization, tradable goods, trade-linked employment 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Chen, L., Felipe, J., Kam, A. J. Y., & Mehta, A. (2018). Is employment globalizing? (ADB Economics Working 
Paper Series No. 556). Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank. 
Required Publisher's Statement 
© Asian Development Back. Available at ADB’s Open Access Repository under a Creative Commons 
Attribution license (CC BY 3.0 IGO). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/679 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ADB ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO. 556
September 2018
IS EMPLOYMENT GLOBALIZING?
Liming Chen, Jesus Felipe, Andrew J.Y. Kam, and Aashish Mehta
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ADB Economics Working Paper Series 
Is Employment Globalizing? 
Liming Chen, Jesus Felipe, Andrew J.Y. Kam, 
and Aashish Mehta 
No. 556 | September 2018 
Liming Chen (limingchen_cn@hotmail.com) is a 
Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of International 
Economics of Nankai University. Jesus Felipe (jfelipe@adb.org) 
is an Advisor at the Economic Research and Regional 
Cooperation Department of the Asian Development Bank. 
Andrew J.Y. Kam (andrew@ukm.edu.my) is an Associate 
Professor and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Malaysian and International Studies of the National University 
of Malaysia. Aashish Mehta (mehta@global.ucsb.edu) is an 
Associate Professor at the Department of Global Studies 
of the University of California Santa Barbara. 
The authors would like to thank Bart Verspagen, Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse, James Galbraith, and participants in 
UCSB’s Global Studies lunch seminar for excellent 
discussions and feedback. 
 Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
© 2018 Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
Tel +63 2 632 4444; Fax +63 2 636 2444
www.adb.org
Some rights reserved. Published in 2018. 
ISSN 2313-6537 (print), 2313-6545 (electronic)
Publication Stock No. WPS189526-2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/WPS189526-2
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views and policies 
of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. 
ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any 
consequence of their use. The mention of speciﬁc companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they 
are endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” 
in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. By using the content of this publication, you agree to be bound 
by the terms of this license. For attribution, translations, adaptations, and permissions, please read the provisions 
and terms of use at https://www.adb.org/terms-use#openaccess.
This CC license does not apply to non-ADB copyright materials in this publication. If the material is attributed 
to another source, please contact the copyright owner or publisher of that source for permission to reproduce it.  
ADB cannot be held liable for any claims that arise as a result of your use of the material.
Please contact pubsmarketing@adb.org if you have questions or comments with respect to content, or if you wish 
to obtain copyright permission for your intended use that does not fall within these terms, or for permission to use 
the ADB logo.
Notes: 
In this publication, “$” refers to United States dollars. 
ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China.
Corrigenda to ADB publications may be found at http://www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda.
CONTENTS 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES iv 
 
ABSTRACT v 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 1 
 
II.  DEFINITIONS, DISTINCTIONS, AND IMPORTANCE 4 
  A. Deﬁnitions and Motivations 4 
  B. Distinctions and Relationships 5 
  C. Relevance of Particular Measures to Particular Policy Discussions 6 
 
III.  RESULTS 8 
  A. Export-Induced Labor Demand 8 
  B. Tradable Employment 12 
  C. Trade-Linked Employment 22 
  D. A Composite View for Some Large Economies 25 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 28 
 
APPENDIXES 30 
 
REFERENCES 35 
 
  
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
TABLES 
 
1 Distinguishing Our Three Notions of Internationally Interconnected Labor Markets 7 
2  The Correlates of Export-Induced Labor Demand 10 
3 Lower and Upper Bound Estimates of the Share of Employment that Is Intrinsically  
Tradable 18 
4 Intrinsically Trade-Linked Employments, Upper and Lower Bounds 24 
5 Tradable Employment, Trade-Linked Employment, and Export-Induced Labor Demand  
for a Common Set of Economics and Years 27 
A4 Assumed Level of Intrinsic Tradability of WIOD and 1-Digit Level ISIC Industries 32 
 
FIGURES 
 
1 The Percentage of Labor Demand that Is Export Induced 9 
2 Decomposing the Changes in Export-Linked Labor Demand, 1995–2011 12 
3 Intrinsically Tradable Employment in the Republic of Korea 14 
4 Intrinsically Tradable Employment in Iceland 15 
5 No Across-the-Board Evidence that Trade-Linked Employment Increased 23 
6 No Across-the-Board Evidence that Trade-Linked Employment  
(Excluding Agriculture) Increased 25 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
We investigate the claim that national labor markets have become more globally interconnected in 
recent decades. We do so by deriving estimates over time of three different notions of 
interconnection: (i) the share of labor demand that is export induced (i.e., all labor demand created by 
foreign entities buying products exported by the home country)—we provide estimates for 40 
countries; (ii) the share of workers employed in sectors producing tradable goods or services—68 
countries; and (iii) the ratio of the number of jobs that are either located in a tradable sector, or that 
are involved in producing services that are required by these tradable sectors, to all jobs in the 
economy, which we call the trade-linked employment share—40 countries. Our estimates lead to the 
conclusion that the evidence of a large increase in the interconnections between national labor 
markets is far weaker than commonly asserted: levels of interconnectivity, and the direction of changes 
over time, vary across notions of interconnection and countries. The main reasons for this are labor-
displacing productivity growth in tradable sectors of each economy and the diminishing fraction of 
national labor forces hired into manufacturing jobs worldwide. We also discuss the implications of our 
results for different policy debates that each of the three measures is associated with: international 
coordination of macroeconomic policies (export-induced labor demand), currency devaluations 
(share of workers producing tradables), and education and labor protection (trade-linked share). 
Keywords: employment, export induced, globalization, tradable goods, trade-linked employment 
JEL codes: F60, F63, F66, F68 
 
 
 
 
“The kids in L.A. are not competing for jobs with kids in Compton; they’re competing with kids in 
China. They’re not competing for jobs with kids in Inglewood, it’s India. This is very much a 
global society.” 
 - John Deasy, Superintendent, Los Angeles Uniﬁed School District1 
 “Clearly, it is now possible for more people than ever to collaborate and compete in real time 
with more other people on more different kinds of work from more different corners of the planet 
and on a more equal footing than at any previous time in the history of the world..”  
 - Thomas Friedman (2005), The World is Flat, p. 8 
“…the ones who are not capable of creating jobs and do not have the opportunities, they must be 
in a position to face their counterparts in any corner of the world while keeping their heads high 
by virtue of their hard work and their dexterity of hands and win the hearts of people around the 
world through their skills. …having taken a resolve to enhance the skill development at a highly 
rapid pace, I want to accomplish this.” 
 - Narendra Modi (2014), Independence Day Speech 
 
I.? INTRODUCTION 
Politicians, policy makers and journalists frequently allude to the idea that labor markets have become 
more internationally interconnected. Our three epigraphs provide a ﬂavor. The presumed globalization 
of work, it is argued (e.g., Freeman 2007), is driven by changes in technology (e.g., supply chain 
management software, electronic communications, containerization) and to policies (e.g., trade 
liberalization, education expansion in developing countries) that have made it possible to wrap 
industrial supply chains through multiple countries and to trade new services over the internet. This 
enhanced scope for international trade and collaboration, it is often claimed, has implications for 
employment-related policies. For example, governments and intergovernmental agencies routinely 
emphasize the growing need to change human resource policies in order to withstand or overcome 
competition. Education reforms to promote skill development and relaxation of proworker labor 
regulations are common targets (e.g., Beach 2013, Chenoy 2013, World Economic Forum 2015). 
Somewhat less publicly, export industry lobby groups emphasize the need to keep currencies cheap in 
the face of growing international competition, with the objective of exporting and preserving jobs. 
Policy makers, including the International Monetary Fund, now emphasize the importance of 
coordinating countercyclical policies internationally (e.g., Blanchard 2008, Lagarde 2016). The idea of 
an increasingly global labor market therefore has considerable hold on the public imagination, and 
accepting it has consequences for policy.  
In this paper, we argue that the idea of a more internationally interconnected labor market is 
not adequately understood, conceptual or empirically. Our efforts help rectify this situation. The 
conceptual problem arises because different policy debates are actually invoking different notions of 
international interconnectedness. We address three such notions in this paper, each of which, we 
suggest, is relevant to a different policy discussion. The empirical problem is that, for a variety of 
                                                                
1  Interview on The Tavis Smiley Show, 25 March 2013. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/tavissmiley/interviews/lausd-superintendent-
dr-john-deasy/. 
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reasons, these notions of interconnectedness have not been measured on a consistent basis over time 
and across countries.2 
The ﬁrst notion of interconnectedness is often discussed by macroeconomists, who ask how 
much of the demand for a country’s labor arises to meet ﬁnal demand for its goods and services in 
other countries. Higher levels of export-induced labor demand are taken to increase the importance of 
international coordination to avoid free riding by countries on each other’s stimulus policies. Thus, this 
is the notion invoked by policy makers discussing such coordinated interventions (Lagarde 2016, 
Blanchard 2008). Second, the international trade and ﬁnance literature refers to the fraction of the 
workforce employed in those sectors of the economy producing tradable goods and services (i.e., 
products/services that could be bought from or sold in other countries). Among other things, knowing 
this tradable employment share sheds light on the welfare implications of currency undervaluation, a 
phenomenon whose costs are felt by consumers, but whose beneﬁts tend to accrue to producers of 
tradables (Obstfeld, Rogoff, and Wren-Lewis 1996; Frieden 2014). 
The third notion, unlike the ﬁrst two, does not appear to be well established in the economics 
literature. Rather, it is implicit in claims that adjustments to the policies and institutions regulating 
human resources (i.e., education and labor relations) are required to permit economies to weather 
growing international competition. We will argue that to assess whether such claims are correct or not, 
one must measure the number of jobs that are either located in a tradable sector, or that are involved 
in producing goods or services that are required by these tradable sectors. We call the ratio of these 
jobs to all jobs in the economy, the trade-linked employment share.3 
Trends in tradable employment and export-induced labor demand have been studied in 
advanced economies (Jensen 2011, Jensen et al. 2005, Blinder and Krueger 2013, Blinder 2009, 
Ebenstein et al. 2014).4 However, other than the occasional single-country study, we know of no 
attempts to measure them in low- and middle-income economies, and have not seen any studies that 
estimate trade-linked employment. Notwithstanding its acknowledged importance for policy, the 
                                                                
2  Other possible notions of labor markets interconnection have been considered in the literature, but one paper cannot cover 
them all. We do not, for example, consider international migration, which has grown relative to the populations of receiving, 
but not sending countries (Czaika and Haas 2014). 
3  Previous studies attempt to (crudely) estimate trade-linked employment at the national level, or, as they describe it, the 
“amount of labor which is engaged in producing goods which are traded internationally” (Harrigan and Balaban 1999, pp. 15–16) 
by multiplying the labor force by the ratio of gross trade (exports plus imports) to gross domestic product (GDP) (Jaumotte 
and Tytell [2008] do likewise at the global level, using the exports in place of the gross trade to prevent double-counting). 
These are early attempts to estimate trade-linked employment. More loosely, Freeman (2007) defines the “global labor 
force” to include all workers in countries that are broadly open to trade, regardless of whether those workers are involved in 
producing tradable products. He estimates that this figure doubled due to the economic opening of India, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and the countries of the former Soviet bloc. 
4  Export-induced employment has been estimated for several countries, but typically to compare the employment effects of 
exports to those of domestic sales. A typical finding is that while a unit of export demand generates less employment than a 
unit of domestic demand—because exports use more imported intermediate inputs—exports could generate lots of labor 
demand because export demand is quite elastic (e.g., Athukorala and Santosa 1997; Los, Timmer, and de Vries 2012; Chen et 
al. 2012; Feenstra and Hong 2010). We have found no papers that have attempted to compare the fraction of a country’s 
labor demand that is export linked over time. Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013) attempt to estimate the 
offshorability (i.e., the possibility that the tasks performed by the occupation be undertaken abroad) of United States (US) 
occupations, a notion obviously related to tradability. Blinder (2009) ranks 291 US occupations for 2004 by offshorability. He 
concludes that the outer limit of potential offshorability ranged from 22% to 29% of the US jobs, and that the more 
offshorable occupations are not low-end jobs. Blinder and Krueger (2013) also conclude that about 25% of all US jobs are 
offshorable; that most of these jobs are performed by well-educated workers; that differences in offshorability by race, sex, 
age, and geographic region are minor; and that offshorability does not have systematic effects on wages or the probability 
of layoff.  
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question of just how “global” labor markets around the world are actually becoming, has therefore 
received little empirical attention from academics. 
We suspect that this lack of attention stems from the formidable data challenges involved. 
Internationally and temporally comparable data on employment by industry are unavailable for many 
countries. The same is true of the input–output tables necessary to study how employment is linked to 
trade through sales of intermediate goods and services. And, crucially, it is generally unknown how 
much of an industry’s output was in fact free to ﬂow across international borders at any point in time.  
Nevertheless, because partial answers are better than no answers at all, we attempt to 
characterize the size and/or trajectory over time of these interconnections for as many countries as 
possible. Our methodological contribution is to show how, and to what extent, this can be done, 
despite the data challenges. These challenges ensure that our conclusions regarding how 
interconnected labor markets are becoming in each dimension will be subject to assumptions, and 
often based on bounds analyses, rather than point estimates. To ensure that our results are robust, we 
draw on three different sources suitable for studying employment across countries and time. To keep 
our claims conservative, we attempt to test every assumption we invoke, or reﬂect on the work of 
others who have. 
One might question, at the outset, whether these efforts are necessary. After all, previous 
studies do provide strong evidence that workers within particular industries increasingly have 
competitors, collaborators, and customers abroad (Deyo 2016; Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 2010; 
Timmer et al. 2014; Gereffi and Frederick 2010). We do not dispute this evidence. Yet, theory cautions 
against characterizing national trends based on what happens within particular industries. The 
international division of labor, so clear in the industries in question, can dramatically increase the level 
of output per worker of such industries (Smith 1776), so that internationalizing industries might 
therefore shed workers. The share of workers employed in industries that either produce tradables or 
are trade linked could fall, as might the share of labor that is employed to meet export demand. In the 
deindustrializing United States (US), for example, 98% of net employment creation between 1990 and 
2008 occurred in nontradable services (Spence and Hlatshwayo 2011). As early deindustrialization in 
employment becomes a worldwide phenomenon (Rodrik 2016; Felipe, Mehta, and Rhee 2018), and 
agricultural employment shares continue to decline in most countries, this tendency to create jobs in 
less trade-dependent sectors may well be spreading. The question is therefore an empirical one. 
Our results will underscore the importance of looking at multiple deﬁnitions of labor 
interconnection, and of not generalizing across countries. Holding the deﬁnition constant, both the 
level of interconnectedness and—perhaps more surprisingly—its trend, vary across countries. Similarly, 
both levels and trends vary across deﬁnitions within the same country. The following general results 
can be stated to orient the reader: 
(i)? The share of labor demand that is export induced has grown rapidly in some (mostly 
European) countries, grown slowly in more, and shrunk in a few (mostly advanced non-
European) economies. This happened because, even as most sectors of most economies 
became more export oriented, rapid increases in output per worker in the most export-
oriented sectors reduced the number of workers they hired. This pushed workers into 
sectors of the economy more reliant on domestic demand. The balance of these two 
countervailing forces determined the speciﬁc outcome in each country.  
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(ii)? Second, the share of workers producing intrinsically tradable products (goods and services 
that would be tradable if trade restrictions were lifted) almost certainly trended 
downward with economic development over time: workers moved out of agriculture (an 
intrinsically tradable sector) and into services (a historically nontradable sector), faster 
than technological change rendered those services jobs tradable.5 It is not possible to say 
whether the lifting of trade restrictions permitted the share of workers in de facto tradable 
sectors (those that are actually tradable given trade rules at the time) to rise despite this 
downward trend. However, even with technological change, long term trends suggest that 
we are headed for a world in which no more than 15%–40% of most country’s workers will 
be hired to produce tradable goods or services.  
 
(iii)? Meanwhile, the general decline in employment in intrinsically tradable sectors has been 
offset by increases in these sectors’ backward linkages into nontradable sectors, so that 
for 30 of the 40 countries for which we can make these calculations, it is impossible to 
discern unambiguous increases or decreases in trade-linked employment. For 10 
countries, trade-linked employment appears to have declined unambiguously. 
It follows that work has globalized in some dimensions and countries, but deglobalized in 
others, depending on what aspect of a globalized labor market one is interested in. The implication is 
that platitudes about globalization of labor markets are seriously misleading. Policy makers need to 
adopt a both case- and policy-speciﬁc approach to thinking about how globalization is and is not 
changing the economic landscape and the menu of policy options they confront. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II deﬁnes and distinguishes our 
three measures of interconnection. Section III provides our methods and results separately for each 
measure, followed by an attempt to characterize countries by their experience with respect to the 
globalization of employment. Section IV recaps the limitations of our work, points to directions for 
future research, and discusses policy implications. Appendix 1 provides details on the estimation of 
export-induced and trade-linked labor demand. Appendix 2 explains how we cleaned the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) dataset. Appendix 3 summarizes our ﬁndings on intrinsically tradable 
employment using an alternative dataset. Finally, Appendix 4 shows our upper and lower estimates of 
intrinsically tradable employment for each sector. 
 
II.? DEFINITIONS, DISTINCTIONS, AND IMPORTANCE 
Table 1 deﬁnes, distinguishes, and motivates our measures of interconnectivity.  
A. Deﬁnitions and Motivations 
Our ﬁrst measure of interconnectedness is the fraction of the labor demanded from a country’s 
workforce that is demanded to meet foreign demand for ﬁnal goods and services (export-induced 
labor demand share, EILD). It captures all labor demand created by foreign entities buying products 
exported by the home country. This includes labor demanded from workers in nontradable sectors, 
such as the labor demand from a truck driver who transports a tennis racket from a factory to a port for 
                                                                
5  The manufacturing sector no longer plays much of a role, as the spread of manufacturing capabilities to less advanced but 
more populous economies limits the sector’s share of employment (Felipe and Mehta 2016; Felipe, Mehta, and Rhee 
2018; ADB 2018). 
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export, as well as labor demanded from the ﬁnanciers, salespeople, and lawyers who made the export 
deal possible. It also includes the labor demanded from the factory workers producing the tennis 
rackets, and from all those involved in producing the intermediate goods that went into it. EILD is 
imputed from the sales of ﬁnal and intermediate goods recorded in input–output tables. 
Second, one might consider the share of workers employed in sectors of the economy 
producing tradable products (goods or services). We shall refer to this ﬁgure as the tradable 
employment share. This is a concept utilized widely in trade theory, where the key distinction between 
tradable and nontradable products is that, given transport costs, tradable products need not be 
produced in proximity to the buyer, but may be delivered cheaply and effectively from a distance. As a 
result, in most basic trade models, the prices of tradable products relative to each other are set in world 
markets. In contrast, the relative prices of nontradables are determined by relative production costs in 
local markets. Conceptually, a sector producing a tradable product is a tradable sector, and the workers 
employed in it contribute to the country’s tradable employment share. Tradable sectors include those 
that compete in overseas markets, and those that are import competing. Tradable employment shares 
are usually estimated from labor force surveys, by counting the workers whose primary jobs are in 
industries deemed to be tradable. 
Our third measure is the fraction of workers who are trade linked. We deﬁne a worker to be 
trade linked if their contribution to production, per dollar spent on their wages has bearing on the 
country’s trade competitiveness. As this measure is not a mainstay in the literature, we make our 
example more speciﬁc, and consider a hypothetical economy that produces only three 
products/services: shoes, which it produces for domestic consumption and which face competition 
from imports; tennis rackets, some of which it exports; and trucking services, which are sold to 
domestic consumers (to move house) as well as to shoe and racket factories. Clearly (holding 
exchange rates and other factor prices constant), the country’s competitiveness in shoes depends on 
the productivity and pay of workers in shoe factories, and on that of those truckers who transport raw 
inputs to shoe factories and shoes to market. If their pay increases, or their productivity falls, then, 
other things equal, shoe imports will rise and employment related to shoe production will decline. 
Similarly, the country’s competitiveness in tennis rackets depend upon the productivity and pay of 
workers in racket factories and of those truckers who keep them supplied and drive their ﬁnished 
products to domestic markets and to ports. All these workers are therefore trade linked. Trade-linked 
employment can be estimated with the aid of input–output tables. 
B. Distinctions and Relationships 
The ﬁrst three rows of Table 1 summarize the differences and relationships between the three 
measures. 
First, tradable employment, trade-linked employment, and export-induced labor demand are 
attributes of different entities (Table 1, row 1). As discussed, tradability is an attribute of products, 
industries and workers, and tradable employment is measured in number of workers. Conversely, only 
a task can be export induced; a worker cannot, as workers often supply labor to meet demand in export 
markets some of the time, and in domestic markets the rest of the time. Trade-linked employment is a 
hybrid concept that combines counting workers and using the input–output tables. It cannot be a 
feature of an industry, because some workers in service industries upstream from tradable sectors do 
not sell services to the tradable sector (e.g., some workers in the trucking sector move household 
furniture and do not interact with shoe and racket factories). It is an idea developed to shed light on 
policies that inﬂuence human capital accumulation and labor regulations—neither of which are 
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attributes of tasks (we train workers, and labor regulations do not vary according to the source of the 
ﬁnal demand). Trade linkage is therefore most usefully treated as a feature of workers. 
Second, the set of workers producing tradables is a subset of those who are trade linked (Table 
1, rows 2 and 3). Every worker in a shoe or a tennis-racket factory produces tradables. All these 
workers, by deﬁnition, are trade linked, but so are those truckers that facilitate their production.  
Finally, although trade-linked employment is a feature of workers, while export-induced labor 
demand is a feature of tasks, the two phenomena are nested in a different way. Any task that is 
performed to meet export demand must be performed by a worker who is, by deﬁnition, trade linked. 
After all, the fact that a trucker sometimes carries tennis rackets to port suffices to make him a trade-
linked worker. A key logical result follows: so long as trade-linked workers put in as much time at work 
as nontrade-linked workers, the share of all person-hours worked that are export induced must be 
smaller than the share of all workers who are trade linked. 
To reiterate: the three concepts are distinct. Two of them are features of workers and one of 
tasks, and the share of workers who are trade linked will be larger than both the fraction of workers who 
produce tradables, and (usually) the fraction of labor demand that is induced by exports. 
C. Relevance of Particular Measures to Particular Policy Discussions 
We now return brieﬂy to the three policy debates discussed in the introduction. Each of them has been 
inﬂuenced by the idea that employment has globalized in some way, and each of them, we contend, 
explicitly or implicitly invokes a distinct measure of internationally interconnected labor. We 
emphasize that we do not necessarily endorse the assumptions and terminologies that underlie the 
debates themselves. Our only claim is that these policy debates occur, and that the tradeoffs being 
debated depend upon the interconnections we attempt to measure in this paper. 
Macroeconomists care about export-induced labor demand because it can increase a 
government’s incentive to free ride on other countries’ efforts to stimulate their economies (e.g., 
Prasad and Sorkin 2009, Cwik and Wieland 2011, and comments by various governments around the 
2009 G20 meetings). Thus, high levels of EILD create a rationale for international coordination of 
ﬁscal policy. Levels of tradable or trade-linked employment are not relevant to this argument. After all, 
a country’s incentive to free ride is totally unrelated to the employment level in its import-competing 
sectors (e.g., its shoe factories), which is included in both tradable and trade-linked employment. 
Similarly, employment upstream from import-competing sectors (e.g., truckers transporting 
domestically produced shoes to local markets), which is included in trade-linked employment, does 
not add to incentives to free ride.  
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Table 1: Distinguishing Our Three Notions of Internationally Interconnected Labor Markets 
 
Export-Induced  
Labor Demand Tradable Employment Trade-Linked Employment 
This is a feature of… Tasks Workers 
What/who is 
included? 
 
Tasks undertaken to produce 
products for sale to 
foreigners  
 
Workers producing tradables
(goods and services that 
could be produced or sold in 
other countries). 
 
Workers producing tradables… 
plus…  
.. workers employed in sectors 
that produce nontradable 
services used in production by 
tradable sectors. 
For example: ?? Labor demanded from 
racket factory workers to 
make those rackets that 
are exported;  
?? Labor demanded from 
truckers to transport 
these rackets to port. 
?? Workers in tennis racket 
or shoe factories 
?? Workers in tennis racket or 
shoe factories 
?? Those truckers who serve 
these factories 
What is not 
included? 
Tasks undertaken to serve 
domestic markets 
Workers producing 
nontradables. 
Those workers producing services 
that are neither tradable nor 
auxiliary to the production of 
tradables. 
For example: ?? Labor demanded from 
factory workers to 
produce shoes and those 
rackets that are sold 
domestically;  
?? Labor demanded from 
truckers to transport 
shoes or tennis rackets to 
local markets. 
?? Labor demanded from 
truckers to help local 
people move house. 
?? All truck drivers ?? Those truck drivers who 
specialize in serving local 
consumers (e.g., moving 
companies) 
 
This measure is 
important because  
it sheds light on 
… the importance of 
coordinating stimulus policy 
internationally. 
… the welfare effects of 
exchange rate policies. 
… the importance of pro-
competitive human resource 
policies. 
Source: Authors. 
 
Lower exchange rates can help promote exports and discourage imports, which should help 
manage international payments imbalances. However, they are also understood to be redistributive, 
boosting employment or earnings in tradable sectors, while reducing household purchasing power. 
They therefore become relatively attractive when the share of workers producing tradables for a living 
is high.6 These arguments about the redistributive effects of currency movements do not hinge on 
export-induced employment. Cheaper currencies improve the fortunes of rice farmers relative to 
those of barbers in countries that export rice (e.g., Thailand) just as they do in countries that import it 
                                                                
6  Devaluations can of course have other effects on welfare, but these two are the main channels discussed in policy circles 
(Frieden 2014).  
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(e.g., the Philippines).7 Thus, the argument is not about exports. The argument does not turn strongly 
on trade-linked employment either. Even those truck drivers who transport rice between farms and 
markets or ports, and are therefore auxiliary to agricultural production, are more likely than farmers to 
be hurt by a currency devaluation. This is because truckers’ earnings are more likely set in local markets 
than are those of farmers.8 
We devised our measure of trade-linked employment to shed light on how relevant arguments 
for pro-competitive education and labor relations policies might be, given the composition of 
employment. Export-linked labor demand and tradable employment shares would both systematically 
underestimate the number of workers whose pay and productivity could imperil trade 
competitiveness, because higher costs in import-competing industries and upstream from them 
matter too. 
 
III. RESULTS 
A. Export-Induced Labor Demand 
We estimate the shares of labor demand that are export induced by combining the National Input–
Output Table (NIOT) with data on employment by sector from the 2014 World Input–Output 
Database Socio-Economic Accounts (WIOD). Both databases are sourced from the World Input–
Output Database.9 We make these estimates separately for each country and year. We use these data 
in the usual way to estimate export-linked demand for labor in each of 35 sectors of each economy, as 
the gross sales required from that sector to meet demand for the country’s exports, multiplied by the 
average labor requirement per unit of sales for that sector. Dividing export-linked labor demand in 
sector i ( )ixl ?  by total sectoral labor demand ( )il  yields the share of labor demand in the sector that is 
export induced ( )iλ . The equations involved are presented in Appendix 1. If we denote aggregate (i.e., 
economywide) labor demand by ?≡ i ill  and total export-linked labor demand by ?≡ i ixx ll ? , then 
the aggregate export-induced labor demand share (henceforth, EILD) is simply llx≡λ . 
 
                                                                
7  We recognize that the example of farmers and barbers paints a somewhat oversimplified picture, insofar as those producers 
of tradables and nontradables who are not self-employed sometimes receive similar wages. However, in this case (and again 
through the lens of the types of basic model invoked in policy circles), a currency devaluation, other things equal, would lead 
to more jobs in shoe and racket factories while driving down the real purchasing power of wages in all three sectors. In other 
words, the pain would be unequally distributed, with nontradables workers seeing only the downside of the devaluation, and 
tradables workers loss of purchasing power at least partially offset by gains in employment. The point remains: in most 
textbook trade models, a devaluation hurts more people if more people produce nontradables, whether this pain is felt on the 
quantity or on the wage axis. 
8  We have been asked whether in those rare instances in which truckers can operate freely across borders (a form of short-
term migration) this could, in theory result in truck drivers’ earnings being set in world markets. This is unlikely outside the 
European Union. Cabotage, transporting goods or passengers from point to point within a country of which one is not a 
citizen, is prohibited under most nation’s laws. The members of the European Union are exceptional in permitting cabotage in 
aviation, shipping, and road transport. A few other exceptions exist, wherein cabotage is permitted through bilateral treaties, 
such as those between Australia and New Zealand. However, even NAFTA’s transportation provisions, if fully implemented, 
would not grant any cabotage rights.  
9  WIOD. http://www.wiod.org/home. 
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Figure 1: The Percentage of Labor Demand that Is Export Induced 
 
Notes: Calculations of export-induced labor demand shares are explained in the text and Appendix 1. Diagonal line is y = x. Non-European 
Union countries are marked by diamonds. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the World Input–Output Database. 
  
Figure 1 provides estimates of EILD in 1995 and 2011 for the 40 WIOD countries. These are the 
earliest and latest years in which all the necessary data are available from the WIOD. The ﬁgure 
provides a 45-degree line separating countries where EILD rose from those where it fell. It also 
distinguishes European Union (EU) from non-EU countries. Perusal of these estimates suggests three 
hypotheses: 
H1: EU members are more export linked. Other than two early industrializers—Taipei,China 
and the Republic of Korea, all other high EILD countries are EU members.  
H2: Size matters. Countries with large domestic markets (e.g., US, Japan, Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Russian Federation) tend to have less export-linked labor demand. 
H3: Per capita income levels are not strongly correlated with export linkages. 
These hypotheses are intuitive. The EU is a common market (H1). Countries with fewer overall 
domestic consumers must tap export markets to exploit economies of scale (H2). And high incomes 
are correlated with a sophisticated export mix, encouraging export-induced employment, but also with 
higher wages, which counterbalances it. 
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Table 2 tests these hypotheses. The columns provide the results when EILD for a particular 
year is regressed, separately for 1995 and 2011, on a dummy variable for EU membership (to test H1), 
the logarithms of population and gross domestic product (GDP) (H2), and the logarithm of GDP per 
capita (H3).10 
Table 2: The Correlates of Export-Induced Labor Demand 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Results in 1995 
EU member dummy 12.85*** 3.73 3.76 
(2.260) (2.602) (2.665) 
Population (in logs) –3.90*** -3.43*** 
(0.633) (0.829) 
lnGDP_PPP –4.00*** –3.39*** 
(0.611) (0.808) 
Per capita GDP (in logs) 2.14 –0.74 1.59 
(1.348) (0.795) (0.979) 
Constant 13.62*** 87.75*** 127.06*** 2.02 84.48*** 93.44*** 
(1.470) (11.001) (16.432) (12.547) (16.790) (18.603) 
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.370 0.571 0.519 0.055 0.591 0.589 
B. Results in 2011 
EU member dummy 14.00*** 6.72* 7.24** 
(2.332) (3.327) (3.359) 
Population (in logs) –3.64*** –2.63*** 
(0.666) (0.953) 
lnGDP_PPP –3.84*** –2.49** 
(0.746) (0.974) 
Per capita GDP (in logs) 3.01* –0.65 0.86 
(1.710) (1.160) (1.346) 
Constant 15.36*** 86.30*** 128.85*** –4.99 71.08*** 78.71*** 
(1.408) (11.744) (20.807) (16.582) (20.382) (24.608) 
Observations 39 39 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.380 0.445 0.400 0.064 0.489 0.474 
EU = European Union, GDP = gross domestic product, PPP = public–private partnership. 
Notes: Dependent variable is the percentage (0–100) of labor demand that is export induced. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The bivariate regression results indicate that EU membership and domestic market size play a 
major role in driving EILD (columns 1–3), while per capita incomes play a smaller role (column 4). 
Multivariate regression results conﬁrm this (columns 5–6). Focusing on the ﬁfth and sixth regressions 
                                                                
10  We use purchasing power parity (PPP) corrected estimates for GDP, but not for per capita GDP, because the purchasing 
power considerations that drive H2 require PPP corrections, while the competitiveness considerations that drive H3 do not.  
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in each panel (which in turn drop population and GDP to avoid estimation of near tautologies), we 
conﬁrm the statistical importance of size and institutions, but not that of per capita income. These 
regressions also suggest that the effects of EU membership on EILD have grown over time, especially 
relative to those of market size.11 
Next, we analyze shifts in EILD. If we denote each sector’s share of total labor demand by iα , 
(aggregate) EILD is simply the employment-weighted average of each sector’s shares of sectoral 
employment that is export linked: 
 
??? ≡≡≡≡
i
ii
i i
ixi
i
ixx
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l λαλ ??
 (1) 
The change in EILD can then be decomposed over time as: 
 ?? ? ? ??? ??? ? ? ??? ???  (2) 
This is a standard between-within sector decomposition, amenable to the following 
interpretation, alluded to at the outset: the effects of large increases in export dependence within 
industries (the ﬁrst summation) may have been counterbalanced by employment shifts out of the 
most export-linked industries (the second).  
Figure 2 presents the results of this decomposition.12 Economies are ranked in descending 
order by the change in EILD. While labor demand became more export induced in 28 economies 
(Hungary–Mexico), it became less export induced in 12 (US–Estonia). Moreover, EILD increased fairly 
slowly in many of the 28 economies in which it rose—to pick two arbitrary cutoffs, EILD increased by 
fewer than 3 percentage points in 11 of these 28 economies; and by fewer than 5 percentage points 
in 19 of the 28. This does not constitute evidence of a dramatic increase in export dependence of 
labor demand. 
The decomposition accounts for weak growth in EILD. All but two large commodity dependent 
countries (Australia and Canada) saw signiﬁcant internationalization of supply chains within sectors.13 
Thus, sector specialists are correct to report that their sectors are growing rapidly more reliant on 
exports for job creation. However, labor demand has gradually shifted from more to less export-linked 
sectors as economies have deindustrialized, moved workers out of agriculture, and shifted into 
services, reducing the rate at which export dependence grew. Indeed, all the economies experiencing 
reductions in EILD are advanced economies, and the only ones to see signiﬁcant increases in EILD 
(Austria; Germany; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China), have pursued industrial policies to retain 
footholds in foreign goods markets. 
                                                                
11  The size of the coefficients in these regressions (columns 5–6) tells a similar story. In 2011, EILD was approximately 7 percentage 
points higher in EU countries than in non-EU countries—ceteris paribus, up from under 4 percentage points in 1995. Differences 
projected based on population are also large: the US’s larger population, relative to Denmark’s, predicts that the former’s EILD 
should have been 10.1 points lower than Denmark’s in 2011, while its larger GDP predicts that its EILD should have been 10.3 
percentage points lower than Denmark’s.  Per capita income has unstable and insignificant effects. 
12  The detailed static and dynamic decomposition tables corresponding to identities (1) and (2) are too large to present. They 
are available on request.  
13  In Australia, EILD fell because agriculture became more focused on meeting domestic demand.  In Canada, the culprit was a 
decline in each manufacturing subsector’s reliance on export demand, as the economy caught the resource curse and the 
Canadian dollar appreciated. 
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Figure 2: Decomposing the Changes in Export-Linked Labor Demand, 1995–2011
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the World Input-Output Database. 
 
 
B. Tradable Employment 
To characterize trends in the share of employment that is tradable, we introduce one further 
distinction: absent policy intervention, a product that might be tradable may in fact be rendered 
nontradable by policies. For example, although cars are intrinsically tradable (they have been traded 
across some national borders for decades), in the past, import restrictions have rendered them de 
facto nontradable in many countries. Similarly, food grains are often rendered de facto nontradable by 
export restrictions. The claim regarding globalization is not simply that technological change pushed 
more jobs from the intrinsically nontradable category into the intrinsically tradable category (although 
this is a key argument in the literature on tradability of services—see Friedman 2005 and Blinder 
2006). Rather, it is that institutional and policy changes, most importantly trade liberalization, made 
products that had always been intrinsically tradable de facto tradable as well. We will deal with this 
problem in two phases. We will begin by characterizing trends in employment in intrinsically tradable 
sectors, showing that the share has trended downwards almost everywhere in recent decades. We will 
then use this to bound de facto tradable employment. The key, if obvious, insight that we will exploit to 
do this is that a job cannot be de facto tradable unless it is intrinsically tradable. 
 
1.  Employment in Intrinsically Tradable Sectors  
It is not possible to identify intrinsically tradable sectors using the data available without heroic 
assumptions. Instead of providing point estimates, we therefore provide lower and upper bound 
estimates of intrinsically tradable employment in as many years as possible. Whenever the lower 
bound at some initial moment in time was higher than the upper bound at a later moment in time, we 
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will conﬁdently assert that the share of employment in intrinsically tradable sectors declined. 
Conversely, if the initial upper bound estimate was lower than the subsequent lower bound estimate, 
we would conﬁdently assert that the share of employment in intrinsically tradable sectors increased—
but this never happens. 
We derive our lower bound by counting all employment in goods producing sectors 
(agriculture, ﬁsheries, forestry, mining, quarrying, and manufacturing) as intrinsically tradable, and all 
services as intrinsically nontradable. This underestimates the level of tradable employment at any 
moment in time, because some services are tradable. It also underestimates the trend over time in the 
share of employment that is in intrinsically tradable sectors, because technology has rendered some 
services intrinsically tradable that were not so before (Jensen 2011).  
Our upper bound estimate draws on Jensen et al.’s (2005) work on the spatial clustering of 
services establishments in the US.14 Jensen and Kletzer argue that domestically nontradable services 
must be produced close to customers, and so will tend to be widely dispersed around the country, 
while domestically tradable services can exploit the agglomeration economies and economies of scale 
that come from clustering far from the ﬁnal consumer. This permits them to explore the tradability of a 
highly disaggregated set of subindustries using the 2000 Decennial Census of Population Public Use 
Micro Sample (IPUMS ﬁles). To ensure that our results using ILO, Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre’s (GGDC), and WIOD data use estimates of services tradability that are in 
principle compatible, we make our estimates of tradable employment ﬁrst for the WIOD and then 
aggregate them up to the 1-digit classiﬁcation used by the ILO and GGDC.15 Appendix 4 provides 
upper bound estimates of the fractions of employment in each WIOD sector and each 1-digit ISIC 
sector that are assumed to be tradable for our upper bound estimates. 
We take these estimates, based on US clustering of industries, as our upper bound for the 
fraction of employment that is intrinsically tradable in each of these nine sectors in every country. This 
assumption is justiﬁed as follows. First, following the logic of New Trade Theory (Krugman 1991), any 
industry is more likely to be clustered within the US than it is to be tradable across international 
borders. This is because transport costs within the US are generally lower than transport costs between 
nations; and because taxes, legal, informational, logistical and other costs of crossing borders between 
US states are likely lower than the corresponding costs of traversing international borders. It follows 
that services that are intrinsically tradable internationally are extremely likely to be clustered in the US. 
Second, many service activities that the spread of internet made possible to offshore (e.g. call centers, 
                                                                
14  We have been asked whether this argument applies to, for example, a chef from France or a professor from the US, serving in 
a restaurant or college in Beijing, given that they are paid wages similar to those in their countries of origin. It usually does: 
these workers provide a service that cannot be produced at a distance from consumers, and the service itself is priced for the 
local market. If their salaries are specified in yuan, then they will not stretch as far if the yuan depreciates. If their salaries are 
specified in dollars, the argument applies partially and in the longer run, as their purchasing power will not decline 
immediately, in response to a depreciation but it becomes more likely that they will be fired or denied raises in future. 
15  We drew on Spence and Hlatshwayo (2011) to do this. Their Appendix II provides estimates of tradability based on Jensen 
and Kletzer’s estimates of tradability by two-digit 2000 census codes. Wherever the Spence and Hlatswayo sectors map 
cleanly onto the 35-sector classification used in the WIOD data, we used their estimates of tradability. We constructed a 
many-to-one mapping from the census sectors to the remaining WIOD sectors. We then treated each census sector with 
medium or high geographic concentration as tradable, and calculated the share of employment in each WIOD sector (in the 
US in 2000) that belongs to tradable census sectors. We also aggregated up from the WIOD to the one-digit codes using US 
employment data from the WIOD. Full details of the procedure are available on request. 
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logistics) were already being delivered across US state lines in 2000. Third, the employment shares of 
the most tradable service subsectors in the US economy are likely to be higher than elsewhere.16 
For maximum country coverage, we carefully cleaned the longest available set of ILO data 
(LABORSTA), yielding usable employment series for 68 countries, covering about 73% of the world’s 
population from 1970 until 2008. For more temporal coverage, we use the GGDC’s 10-sector 
database, covering 43 countries over variable periods spanning 1947–2013. Cleaning procedures 
appear in Appendix 2. Results using GGDC data are fully consistent with those reported here, and 
appear in Appendix 3. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate our approach. In 1970, 65.5% of the Republic of Korea’s employed 
labor force worked in goods-producing sectors, and no more than 68.4% worked in sectors producing 
either goods, or services that would be considered tradable in the US by the year 2000. These ﬁgures 
fell to 24% and 38.3% by 2008. Because the lower bound in 1970 is higher than the upper bound in 
2008, we can assert with conﬁdence that the fraction of Korean workers employed in intrinsically 
tradable sectors declined. No such conﬁdence is possible in Iceland, where our series begins in 1991 
with lower and upper bound estimates of 27.5% and 39.6% respectively, but end in 2008 at 16.2% and 
32% respectively. Employment- producing goods fell in Iceland, but we cannot rule out the possibility 
that employment in intrinsically tradable services grew fast enough to compensate for this. 
 
Figure 3: Intrinsically Tradable Employment in the Republic of Korea 
 
Note: Lower bound assumes only goods are tradable. Upper adds tradable services drawing on Spence and Hlatshwayo (2011). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the International Labour Organization, ?????????????????????????????????????????and 
World Input–Output Database. 
 
                                                                
16  Jensen et al.’s (2005) methodology has been criticized for potentially misidentifying industries that are merely urban, as 
tradable (Blinder 2009). This possibility actually works to our advantage when using their estimates to derive upper bounds 
on tradability. 
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Figure 4: Intrinsically Tradable Employment in Iceland 
 
Note: Lower bound assumes only goods are tradable. Upper adds tradable services drawing on Spence and Hlatshwayo (2011). 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the International Labour Organization, ?????????????????????????????????????????and 
World Input–Output Database. 
 
The Korean and Icelandic cases are helpful in three other respects. First, they demonstrate 
something that we will demonstrate holds in every Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development country—namely that the upper and lower bound estimates of intrinsically tradable 
employment both fall in the 15%–40% range by the late 2000s.  
Second, they suggest that employment in intrinsically tradable services has risen quite 
dramatically, especially at early stages of development. This ﬁgure, which is the gap between our upper 
and lower bound estimates of intrinsically tradable employment, expanded from 2.9% (68.4%-65.5%) 
in 1970 to 14.3% by 2008 in the Republic of Korea, and from 12.1% to 15.8% in Iceland. This is why the 
possibility that intrinsically tradable employment has risen must be taken seriously: in employment 
terms, tradable services may have grown faster than agriculture and manufacturing have shrunk. 
Third, they impress on us that the results of the bounds analysis may not be comparable across 
countries, as the time periods for which we have employment data vary across countries. The fact that 
we see an unambiguous decrease in intrinsically tradable employment in the Republic of Korea but not 
Iceland might simply reﬂect the fact the Icelandic data do not go back far enough. Analysis of the 
GGDC dataset, which covers a different and smaller set of countries over a longer time period, solves 
this problem. 
We are attentive to concerns about manufacturing ﬁrms’ increased outsourcing of 
intermediate service activities to other domestic ﬁrms. This could lead our upper and lower bound 
measures to register spuriously large declines (Tregenna 2010; Kakaomerlioglu Cetindamar, and 
Carlsson 1999). Nevertheless, our upper bound should still overestimate tradable employment outside 
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the US. For one thing, outsourcing of producer services by manufacturing ﬁrms is a process that had 
likely progressed further in the US than in most countries.17 Moreover, production services that are 
auxiliary to manufacturing do cluster geographically around manufacturing ﬁrms (Kakaomerlioglu, 
Cetindamar, and Carlsson 1999), so that those productive services subsectors receiving the jobs tend 
to be classiﬁed as tradable in our upper bound. Thus, even while increases in outsourcing probably 
cause the “true” intrinsically tradable employment share to move further from the lower bound 
estimate and closer to the upper bound estimate as time goes on, a later upper bound that is below the 
earlier lower bound can be taken to indicate a decline in intrinsically tradable employment. 
To summarize what our bounds analysis tells us about trends around the world, we ﬁrst 
estimate separately the slopes of lower- and upper-bound lines for each of our countries. Then, we 
classify countries according to whether these series suggest that they have globalized, deglobalized, or 
fall into an ambiguous category. Acknowledging that the conventional wisdom is that work is 
globalizing, we use a classiﬁcation scheme that errs in favor of ﬁnding that employment in each 
country has either globalized or has an ambiguous trend. Thus, we conclude that a country 
“deglobalized” in terms of the intrinsic tradability of employment if two conditions are met: (i) the 
slopes of both the upper and lower bound series are negative and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% 
signiﬁcance level); and (ii) the earliest lower bound estimate is higher than the subsequent upper 
bound estimate (e.g., the Republic of Korea). We deem countries for which the initial upper bound is 
lower than the subsequent lower bound to have “globalized.” The rest (e.g., Iceland) are “ambiguous.” 
Table 3 summarizes the results for our sample of 68 economies based on the ILO data and 
utilizes these to classify each economy as globalizing, deglobalizing or ambiguous over this period. The 
economies are arranged by region, and the regions are arranged in rough descending order by per 
capita income. The results reveal a general hierarchy across levels of development, with intrinsically 
tradable employment shares generally in a much higher range amongst the less developed economies. 
This mostly reﬂects the well-understood fact that richer economies have lower agricultural 
employment shares, and also that economies that industrialized earlier are today richer and also had 
higher manufacturing employment shares (Felipe, Mehta, and Rhee 2018).  
This negative cross-sectional association between economic development and intrinsically 
tradable employment is also apparent within countries over time. The growth rates of the lower bound 
estimates (excluding tradable services) or the upper bound estimates (including tradable services) are 
negative in almost every country, and 50 countries, capturing 94% of the population represented by 
our data deglobalized in the period for which we have data. The remaining 18 countries, which account 
for the other 6% of the represented population, fall in the ambiguous category. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
many of the countries in the ambiguous category are either advanced or island economies (Australia, 
Bahamas, Canada, The Dutch Antilles, Finland, Iceland, Israel, Montserrat, New Zealand, and San 
Marino), with the low agricultural and manufacturing employment levels that come respectively with 
higher wages or physical distance. Others among these 18 belong to the former Communist bloc with 
short time series that begin in the 1990s (Azerbaijan, Hungary, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Mongolia). 
                                                                
17  The extent of domestic outsourcing is notoriously difficult to compare across countries (e.g., see Kakaomerlioglu, 
Cetindamar, and Carlsson 1999, Table 1). However, the view that outsourcing of manufacturing activity to service firms was 
most advanced by the turn of the century in liberal market economies like the US is standard in work on the varieties of 
capitalism (Soskice and Hall 2001), US labor relations (Brown, Eichengreen, and Reich 2009), and firm strategy (Berger 
2005). Similarly, Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff (2003), document rapid downsizing in US manufacturing and upsizing in 
nonmanufacturing starting in 1987, and link this to the US’s exceptionally rapid political and institutional shift to the right. 
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The remaining countries in the ambiguous category have experienced relatively limited exit from 
agriculture (Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nicaragua).18  
Finally, if we focus on the richest economies (which can be found by starting with the Republic 
of Korea and working up the table—skipping Turkey), we see that the share of employment in 
intrinsically tradable sectors is under 40% in all of them. A reasonable description puts the range 
between the lower and upper bounds at 15%–40%.  
 
                                                                
18  Notwithstanding our efforts to clean the ILO data using a priori reasonable rules, the data from Botswana are suspect, with 
intrinsically tradable employment declining from the high 60% range to the high 30% range between 1985 and the mid-
1990s, and then rising back up to 40%–50% by 2008. 
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Table 3: Lower and Upper Bound Estimates of the Share of Employment that Is Intrinsically Tradable 
      Earliest Observation   Latest Observation   Lower Bound Slope Upper Bound Slope     
Region Economy Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Category 
Western European and Others 
Australia 1980 27.6% 40.3% 2008 14.8% 32.9% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Ambiguous
Austria 1983 38.7% 50.2% 2008 22.8% 40.0% –0.007 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Belgium 1970 38.0% 48.9% 2008 18.3% 36.8% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Canada 1987 22.5% 38.3% 2008 15.8% 34.9% –0.002 (0.000) –0.001 (0.006) Ambiguous
Cyprus 1976 44.6% 54.0% 1995 26.4% 40.2% –0.009 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Denmark 1972 34.8% 46.7% 2008 17.8% 35.1% –0.004 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Finland 1989 30.3% 45.9% 2008 21.8% 40.3% –0.004 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Ambiguous
France 1969 42.2% 52.2% 2008 18.1% 36.1% –0.006 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Greece 1981 50.5% 60.6% 2008 23.5% 32.8% –0.011 (0.000) –0.009 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Iceland 1991 27.5% 40.5% 2008 16.2% 32.8% –0.007 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Ambiguous
Ireland 1969 49.1% 57.0% 2008 18.7% 36.2% –0.008 (0.000) –0.005 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Italy 1977 43.6% 51.6% 2008 24.5% 41.8% –0.006 (0.000) –0.002 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Luxembourg 1970 42.5% 52.2% 2006 10.7% 39.4% –0.010 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
The Netherlands 1969 34.8% 46.3% 2008 14.3% 33.5% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
New Zealand 1986 31.6% 44.1% 2008 19.8% 36.4% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Ambiguous
Norway 1972 36.6% 46.6% 2008 15.8% 32.0% –0.006 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Portugal 1974 60.8% 66.5% 2008 29.4% 41.7% –0.009 (0.000) –0.008 (0.000) Deglobalizing
San Marino 1978 43.2% 47.5% 2008 29.4% 46.7% –0.005 (0.000) –0.002 (0.004) Ambiguous
Spain 1969 58.1% 64.6% 2008 19.7% 36.5% –0.010 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Sweden 1969 39.2% 50.9% 2008 16.7% 36.2% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Switzerland 1969 46.5% 55.5% 2008 19.9% 38.7% –0.008 (0.000) –0.005 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Turkey 1988 62.8% 68.0% 2004 51.9% 59.1% –0.008 (0.000) –0.006 (0.000) Deglobalizing
United Kingdom 1969 39.8% 50.8% 2008 13.9% 34.2% –0.007 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
United States 1969 32.7% 43.1% 2002 16.2% 31.6% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
continued on next page
 
Is Em
ploym
ent G
lobalizing?
|
19 
 
      Earliest Observation   Latest Observation   Lower Bound Slope Upper Bound Slope     
Region Economy Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Category 
 
Early Asian Industrializers 
Hong Kong, China 1978 46.0% 54.4% 2008 5.7% 26.4% –0.015 (0.000) –0.010 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Japan 1976 38.1% 47.5% 2008 22.6% 39.1% –0.005 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Korea, Rep. of 1969 65.6% 68.7% 2008 24.1% 40.1% –0.012 (0.000) –0.009 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Bolivia 1976 62.4% 66.4% 2007 48.7% 56.2% –0.004 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Brazil 1970 55.8% 61.2% 2010 26.5% 37.8% –0.006 (0.000) –0.005 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Chile 1975 41.5% 49.1% 2008 26.0% 39.6% –0.003 (0.000) –0.001 (0.004) Deglobalizing
Costa Rica 1987 45.6% 52.3% 2008 24.7% 38.5% –0.010 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Cuba 1995 40.0% 46.3% 2008 30.1% 38.2% –0.008 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
El Salvador 1975 58.1% 61.8% 2007 34.9% 37.6% –0.008 (0.000) –0.008 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Haiti 1969 80.3% 81.8% 1990 73.1% 75.2% –0.005 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Honduras 1970 74.3% 77.3% 2007 49.7% 56.2% –0.008 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Jamaica 1992 39.2% 47.4% 2008 25.7% 37.1% –0.008 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Mexico 1960 51.0% 57.2% 2010 29.0% 39.6% –0.005 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Netherlands Antilles 1989 10.6% 25.2% 2008 8.2% 28.3% –0.002 (0.000) 0.001 (0.139) Ambiguous
Nicaragua 1990 48.8% 53.7% 2006 43.3% 50.6% –0.003 (0.039) –0.002 (0.148) Ambiguous
Panama 1969 47.4% 53.0% 2008 22.7% 35.0% –0.006 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Puerto Rico 1969 30.8% 37.9% 2008 12.0% 20.7% –0.004 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Trinidad and Tobago 1969 41.5% 47.1% 2008 16.6% 29.3% –0.006 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Venezuela 1975 36.6% 44.9% 2008 21.3% 32.6% –0.005 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Small Island Nations 
Bahamas 1973 16.1% 28.8% 1993 9.6% 22.9% –0.002 (0.022) –0.002 (0.040) Ambiguous
Barbados 1976 25.9% 35.0% 2004 9.1% 20.8% –0.006 (0.000) –0.005 (0.000) Deglobalizing
Montserrat 1975 21.6% 30.3% 1991 12.4% 22.4% –0.003 (0.009) –0.003 (0.004) Ambiguous
                
Table 3 continued 
continued on next page
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      Earliest Observation   Latest Observation   Lower Bound Slope Upper Bound Slope     
Region Economy Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Year 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Coeff. P-Value Coeff. P-Value Category 
East and Southeast Asia 
China, People’s  Rep. of 1982 87.2% 88.6% 2010 66.4% 71.4% –0.007 (0.002) –0.006 (0.003) Deglobalizing 
Indonesia 1976 72.7% 75.2% 2008 53.6% 59.6% –0.005 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Malaysia 1980 54.2% 58.6% 2008 32.7% 43.8% –0.006 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Myanmar 1978 75.4% 81.8% 1998 72.4% 76.7% 0.000 (0.493) –0.002 (0.000) Ambiguous 
Philippines 1977 62.4% 67.7% 2008 44.3% 53.2% –0.007 (0.000) –0.006 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Thailand 1971 82.1% 83.7% 2008 56.4% 62.1% –0.007 (0.000) –0.006 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Former Communist Bloc 
Azerbaijan 1991 44.1% 49.2% 2008 44.4% 52.3% 0.002 (0.207) 0.004 (0.029) Ambiguous 
Estonia 1989 48.3% 59.5% 2008 25.9% 41.9% –0.011 (0.000) –0.008 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Hungary 1992 27.1% 40.0% 2008 22.7% 38.7% –0.002 (0.000) 0.000 (0.407) Ambiguous 
Kyrgyz Republic 1986 49.9% 56.4% 2008 42.8% 50.3% 0.000 (0.979) 0.000 (0.966) Ambiguous 
Moldova 1981 59.7% 64.6% 2008 42.3% 50.4% –0.004 (0.000) –0.003 (0.002) Deglobalizing 
Mongolia 1994 10.2% 16.4% 2008 9.0% 16.2% –0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.820) Ambiguous 
Poland 1981 59.5% 68.1% 2008 35.9% 45.3% –0.010 (0.000) –0.008 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Romania 1969 73.1% 76.8% 2008 50.5% 59.7% –0.004 (0.000) –0.003 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Russian Federation 1990 42.4% 48.4% 2008 27.0% 40.4% –0.008 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Middle East and North Africa 
Egypt 1970 66.5% 70.3% 2008 43.2% 50.8% –0.007 (0.000) –0.006 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Israel 1969 33.6% 43.7% 2008 17.0% 35.9% –0.004 (0.000) –0.002 (0.000) Ambiguous 
Syria 1970 62.9% 66.9% 2007 35.5% 43.3% –0.010 (0.000) –0.009 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
South Aisa 
Bangladesh 1984 67.8% 71.3% 2005 59.2% 66.0% –0.004 (0.211) –0.003 (0.299) Ambiguous 
India 1983 75.9% 78.9% 2011 62.0% 66.5% –0.004 (0.004) –0.004 (0.008) Deglobalizing 
Pakistan 1973 70.2% 74.3% 2008 57.8% 63.2% –0.004 (0.000) –0.004 (0.000) Deglobalizing 
Sub–Saharan Africa 
Botswana 1985 64.4% 67.5% 2006 39.2% 48.1% –0.014 (0.068) –0.011 (0.104) Ambiguous 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the International Labour Organization.
Table 3 continued 
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2.  Employment in De Facto Tradable Sectors  
As noted previously, trade restrictions have historically rendered many intrinsically tradable sectors 
nontradable in fact. It follows that trade liberalization could have resulted in rising employment in de 
facto tradable sectors if the shift of employment out of intrinsically tradable sectors was overwhelmed 
by growing de facto tradability of some high-employment intrinsically tradable sectors.  
Indeed, one imperfect indicator suggests that the de facto tradability of several sectors has 
trended upward. We have used the National Input–Output tables for 40 countries to calculate the 
ratio of exports plus imports to gross production for 16 different goods producing industries in each 
year from 1995 to 2011. This is a standard proxy for de facto tradability, which when measured at the 
aggregate (economywide) level is utilized to estimate the trade dependence of nations. When we 
regress the log of this measure on the year it was measured, separately for each country and industry 
(i.e., 640 country–industry pairs, or sectors), the growth rate is positive and signiﬁcant at the 10% level 
for 427 goods producing sectors. It exceeds 1% per annum in 267 of them. When estimated for 19 
services subsectors for the same countries, this crude measure of tradability registers statistically 
signiﬁcant increases in 369 out of 760 country–industry pairs.  
Whether this increase in tradability of goods and services implies an increase in the amount of 
labor implicated in this trade is unknowable. It is therefore not possible to measure the net effect of 
these contrasting trends in tradability within and between sectors. De facto tradable employment 
could therefore have increased or decreased in any particular country and historical moment, even as 
employment shifted out of intrinsically tradable sectors.  
This said, our results on intrinsically tradable employment remain interesting for at least three 
reasons. First, the most signiﬁcant barriers to trade have already been removed. Thus, the distinction 
between de facto and intrinsic tradability of sectors might be of more historic than current interest. 
The difference between them may be small already, and unlikely to change much in future. Second, 
even if there is still room for de facto tradability to rise within intrinsically tradable sectors, intrinsically 
tradable employment itself is already so low in advanced economies, that rising de facto tradability is 
unlikely to result in large absolute increases in the number of jobs producing tradables. Third, if we are 
headed for a world in which only 15%–40% of employment remains in intrinsically tradable sectors, the 
share of employment that is in de facto tradable sectors cannot be any higher than this. 
These conclusions could change if technological shifts render tradable services that we 
classiﬁed as intrinsically nontradable based on their geographic distribution in the US in the year 2000. 
Such technological changes are likely to lower the prices of tradables relative to nontradables, and this 
could shift demand toward tradable products. However, technological change often generates labor 
redundancy. The net effects of these shifts on the composition of employment is therefore harder to 
predict than their effects on intersector wage differences (Blinder 2006). For example, while online 
retailing has exploded in the US during the last decade and a half, and could eventually render e-
retailing internationally tradable, e-retailing ﬁrms themselves hire notoriously few workers, and 
certainly fewer than traditional retailing (Cowen 2011, 2013). Moreover, many of the jobs in other 
sectors that are created by online retailing (warehousing and delivery driving) are obviously place 
based (nontradable) and counted within the transportation and warehousing sector, whose 
employment in the US has grown since 2000 while employment in the retail sector remained ﬂat 
(Spence and Hlatshwayo 2011, Figure 6).  
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C.  Trade-Linked Employment 
Trade-linked employment includes tradable employment and employment producing intermediate 
products for sale to tradable sectors. As in section III.B, we are hindered by the fact that there are no 
available estimates of how much labor in each sector in each country is intrinsically tradable, as well as 
by the fact that we do not know how much intrinsically-tradable employment is de facto tradable. As 
before, we therefore proceed by putting bounds on intrinsically trade-linked employment. We 
continue to assume, for our lower bound estimates, that only goods are tradable, and for our upper 
bound estimates, we assume that some services are tradable based on US geographic clustering of 
industries. Details of these calculations are in Appendix 1. Also, as before, we will use these estimates 
of intrinsically tradable employment, along with the fact that all de facto tradable products are 
intrinsically tradable, to inform speculation on de facto tradable employment. Given the low level of 
trade barriers in place by 2011 (the last year for which we can analyze intrinsically trade-linked 
employment), we will argue that if recent trends in intrinsically trade-linked employment are indicative 
of ongoing structural trends, de facto tradable employment should follow suit. 
Figure 5 displays the upper and lower bounds for the intrinsically trade-linked employment 
shares for 40 countries in 1995 and 2011. The left-hand side of Figure 5 plots the 2011 upper bound 
against the 1995 lower bound, seeking unambiguous evidence of a decline in trade-linked employment. 
This is found for 10 countries. Three of these are large developing countries still moving out of 
agriculture (India, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia), and ﬁve are Eastern European 
economies whose supply chains have had to adjust to a post-Soviet industrial landscape (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). Meanwhile, Turkey deindustrialized and Irish workers moved 
from agriculture into construction and nontradable services. 
The right-hand side of Figure 5 plots the 2011 lower bound against the 1995 upper bound, 
seeking cases in which trade-linked employment increased unambiguously. No cases are uncovered. 
Intrinsically trade-linked employment therefore fell unambiguously in 10 countries, and its trajectory 
cannot be discerned in 30 others. 
Table 4 lists the bounds of trade-linked employment in 1995 (year 0) and 2011 (year 1). 
Economies are ordered by the maximum possible level of trade-linked employment in 2011. The table 
makes clear why trends in trade-linked employment in so many economies are ambiguous. With the 
exception of the 10 economies with unambiguously declining trade-linked employment shares, the 
difference between lower and upper bounds lies in the range of 12%–33%. This considerable ambiguity, 
driven by uncertainty over the percentage of services employment that is tradable, intersects with 
small changes in the upper and lower bound estimates over time, leaving the trends in trade-linked 
employment over time ambiguous for these economies. 
Table 4 also reveals dramatic differences in the degree of trade-linked employment across 
economies. Large, lower-income economies appear to be much more trade linked than small higher-
income economies. As with tradable employment, this reﬂects the small size of the agricultural sector 
in richer economies, and the low levels of compensating manufacturing employment. 
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Figure 5: No Across-the-Board Evidence that Trade-Linked Employment Increased
  …decreased… …or increased? 
 
Note: Trade-linked employment decreased  Note: Trade-linked employment increased 
unambiguously in countries below the line. unambiguously in countries above the line. 
Source: ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? 
 
One numerical reﬁnement is required before policy conclusions can be drawn. The numbers in 
Figure 5 shed light on the number of workers whose pay and productivity matter for international 
competitiveness. We also suggested that this would be the same set of workers whose education and 
labor protection would matter for competitiveness. The numbers in Figure 5 are probably a reasonable 
proxy for advanced economies. In many lower income countries, however, vocational training is 
typically considered for workers in secondary education—which excludes most farmers; and the labor 
protection that governments are considering trimming do not apply to farmers either. To examine the 
case for such policy changes, Figure 6 therefore re-estimates trade-linked employment after removing 
agricultural workers from the numerator and the denominator. In other words, it presents the fraction 
of nonagricultural employment that is trade linked but not in agriculture. This shifts all countries, save 
Romania, into the ambiguous category. 
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Table 4: Intrinsically Trade-Linked Employments, Upper and Lower Bounds 
1995 2011 
Economy 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Spread 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Spread 
Cyprus 26.9 40.0 13.1 17.7 33.1 15.4 
United States 22.4 40.0 17.6 15.0 34.9 19.9 
Australia 27.9 45.3 17.4 20.0 39.3 19.3 
Ireland 40.4 53.9 13.5 21.0 39.4 18.4 
Latvia 43.0 56.4 13.4 21.1 40.4 19.3 
Malta 26.8 42.3 15.5 19.1 40.7 21.6 
United Kingdom 25.9 45.2 19.3 16.9 40.7 23.8 
Denmark 30.2 46.6 16.4 21.7 42.5 20.8 
Japan 34.8 47.7 12.9 26.0 42.7 16.7 
Lithuania 45.2 56.6 11.4 25.7 42.8 17.1 
Greece 37.7 51.7 14.0 25.8 43.1 17.3 
Sweden 30.8 46.1 15.3 24.4 43.7 19.3 
France 29.3 47.5 18.2 22.7 44.2 21.5 
Canada 29.2 43.9 14.7 27.3 44.3 17.0 
Mexico 44.3 49.6 5.3 37.1 44.8 7.7 
Spain 35.3 49.5 14.2 25.9 45.2 19.3 
Belgium 28.4 47.6 19.2 21.3 45.5 24.2 
The Netherlands 28.2 48.2 20.0 22.9 45.6 22.7 
Estonia 44.5 58.6 14.1 28.9 45.7 16.8 
Luxembourg 21.6 46.1 24.5 12.4 45.7 33.3 
Portugal 44.4 54.2 9.8 32.0 46.9 14.9 
Finland 37.5 50.7 13.2 29.6 47.6 18.0 
Austria 34.7 49.4 14.7 30.4 48.6 18.2 
Italy 37.9 51.6 13.7 31.2 49.0 17.8 
Germany 34.7 49.4 14.7 31.0 50.5 19.5 
Brazil 47.7 59.6 11.9 35.8 50.9 15.1 
Russian Federation 51.2 59.1 7.9 42.3 51.2 8.9 
Slovak 44.0 57.2 13.2 33.8 51.2 17.4 
Korea, Rep. of 43.2 53.2 10.0 34.8 51.3 16.5 
Bulgaria 52.3 59.7 7.4 41.8 52.2 10.4 
Poland 56.1 64.8 8.7 40.1 52.6 12.5 
Slovenia 53.1 66.0 12.9 35.7 54.3 18.6 
Taipei,China 46.7 54.9 8.2 44.6 55.5 10.9 
Hungary 45.0 59.3 14.3 40.0 55.8 15.8 
Czech Republic 44.1 58.8 14.7 39.4 57.1 17.7 
Turkey 65.1 68.3 3.2 51.3 57.3 6.0 
Romania 70.5 78.0 7.5 48.8 60.5 11.7 
Indonesia 67.2 70.6 3.4 54.9 61.0 6.1 
China, People’s Rep. of 75.1 79.5 4.4 61.4 68.5 7.1 
India 79.4 81.9 2.5 71.1 75.1 4.0 
Source: Authors' calculations using data from the World Input–Output Database. 
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Figure 6: No Across-the-Board Evidence that Trade-Linked Employment  
(Excluding Agriculture) Increased 
  …decreased… …or increased? 
 
Note: Trade-linked employment (excluding Note: Trade-linked employment (excluding  
agriculture) decreased unambiguously in agriculture) increased unambiguously in  
countries below the line. countries above the line. 
Source: ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? 
 
 
D. A Composite View for Some Large Economies 
So far, we have analyzed tradable employment using ILO and GGDC data, while using WIOD data for 
export-induced labor demand and trade-linked employment. The time periods analyzed and some 
deﬁnitions vary across these analyses. To obtain a composite view, and thereby make useful structural 
comparisons between economies, Table 5 presents the levels in each measure using GGDC data in the 
years 1995 and 2011 for a dozen systemically important economies. Economies are arranged in order of 
per capita GDP.  
Two results that are ensured by construction illustrate propositions from section II: intrinsically 
trade-linked employment exceeds intrinsically tradable employment at either the upper or lower 
bound; and, the upper bound estimates of trade-linked employment always exceed the EILD. 
We discern a crude clustering of countries in this table.  
(i)? In the Lowest Income Economies (India, Indonesia, and the PRC) intrinsically tradable and 
trade-linked employment declined unambiguously as labor moved rapidly out of 
agriculture and into nontradable, inward-looking services. However, these countries did 
open up to trade, so that export-induced employment rose modestly, and linkages 
between nontradable and tradable sectors thickened. Brazil resembles these countries, 
26  |  ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 556 
 
but has more employment in potentially tradable service sectors, as is clear from the 
larger gap between its upper and lower bounds on tradable and trade-linked employment. 
Trends in tradable employment in Brazil are therefore ambiguous during this period 
(though not, we saw in section III.B, over longer time spans).  
(ii)? Germany; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China (to an extent, Japan) are Persistent 
Manufacturing Economies. They had the highest levels of trade-linked employment among 
the advanced economies by 2011. They are also the only advanced economies in which 
the EILD is growing fast. Within this group, Japan has a very low but steadily rising the 
EILD, which presumably reﬂects the already high levels of offshored manufacturing 
production in 1995, and its movement upstream into the management of multinational 
manufacturing activity in the years since. 
(iii)? The other advanced economies (United Kingdom, France, and the US) having already 
transitioned from agriculture and manufacturing into services, have the lowest tradable 
and trade-linked employment shares in the sample. Changes in the EILD have also been 
small or negative. 
(iv)? Mexico, with substantial amounts of export-oriented manufacturing employment near its 
Northern border and employment trends more typical of a developing economy further 
south, illustrates the limits of applying a national lens to study this issue. 
 
We therefore conclude that the transition of national economies out of agriculture and into 
services creates a deglobalizing structural undercurrent, while expanding global trade works in the 
opposite direction. It is those economies that are most successful in supporting manufacturing that are 
best able to project labor outward into other countries. In other countries, labor globalization is 
experienced as a thickening of intersector and international trade ﬂows that displaces some from the 
tradable sectors, and does not dramatically increase the fraction of the workforce interacting with 
workers in other countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Tradable Employment, Trade-Linked Employment, and Export-Induced Labor Demand for a Common Set of Economics and Years  
Economy  
Per Capita GDP 
(2011 
International $) 
Share of Employment  
in Tradables   Trade-Linked Employment Export-Induced  
Labor Demand 1995 2011 1995 2011 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Conclusion 
of Bounds 
Analysis 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Conclusion 
of Bounds 
Analysis 1995 2011 Change 
India 4,636 73.8 76.8 63.9 68.4 Fell 79.4 81.9 71.1 75.1 Fell 8.8 13.1  4.3 
Indonesia 8,838  60.8 64.1 49.2 54.6 Fell  67.2 70.6 54.9 61.0 Fell  13.0 14.4  1.4 
China, People’s  
 Rep. of 10,384  69.4 74.1 53.9 60.7 Fell  75.1 79.5 61.4 68.5 Fell  16.4 18.4  2.0 
Brazil 14,973  39.3 50.8 26.4 41.3 Ambiguous  47.7 59.6 35.8 50.9 Ambiguous  8.9 12.4  3.5 
Mexico 15,923  38.8 44.3 31.2 39.5 Ambiguous  44.3 49.6 37.1 44.8 Ambiguous  15.7 16.0  0.3 
Korea, Rep. of 31,229  35.5 45.9 25.0 41.8 Ambiguous  43.2 53.2 34.8 51.3 Ambiguous  20.5 27.2  6.6 
Japan 35,775  27.7 40.1 19.6 35.0 Ambiguous  34.8 47.7 26.0 42.7 Ambiguous  7.8 10.8  3.0 
United Kingdom 36,456  18.3 37.4 12.0 34.0 Ambiguous  25.9 45.2 16.9 40.7 Ambiguous  17.9 19.0  1.0 
France 37,457  21.2 39.4 14.0 36.2 Ambiguous  29.3 47.5 22.7 44.2 Ambiguous  18.1 17.8  –0.3 
Germany 42,693  25.8 41.7 19.7 41.4 Ambiguous  34.7 49.4 31.0 50.5 Ambiguous  18.5 28.6  10.1 
United States 49,791  16.4 33.8 10.8 29.4 Ambiguous  22.4 40.0 15.0 34.9 Ambiguous  8.0 7.9  –0.1 
Taipei,China 
  
36.5 45.2 32.6 44.5 Ambiguous 
 
46.7 54.9 44.6 55.5 Ambiguous 
 
31.7 39.7  8.0 
Note: Calculations are explained in Appendix 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the World Input–Ouput Database and National Input–Output Table.
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IV.? DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
We have examined the idea that national labor markets are becoming more interconnected. We 
argued at the outset that there are different notions of interconnection, and that each notion has 
bearing on a different policy debate. Here, we summarize our ﬁndings, the areas of ambiguity around 
them, and lay out what they do and do not mean for different policy debates. What follows are 
generalizations, with many exceptions detailed in section III. 
We were able to produce point estimates of the share of labor demand that is export induced 
for many economies. This ﬁgure has risen in most economies, but not in all of them, and based on 
within-industry trends alone, not as fast as one might think. This is because while exports have 
increased rapidly, those industries most involved in exporting have shed workers—presumably 
because globalization has brought these industries much faster rates of labor productivity growth. 
Consequently, especially in advanced economies that have deindustrialized in employment, the share 
of employment that is export induced is now quite low. This may explain why trade and globalization 
have enjoyed limited electoral support in advanced economies in recent years. More broadly, there is 
continued divergence across countries in export-induced labor demand: it is both highest and fastest 
growing in the advanced still-industrial economies (Germany; the Republic of Korea; Taipei,China). 
This suggests that any incentives to free ride on other economies’ stimulus policies are unevenly 
distributed, and becoming more so. 
Next, we showed that the share of employment that is in intrinsically tradable sectors has 
declined, especially in the lowest-income countries. Declining agricultural employment and weak 
manufacturing employment growth within countries seems to have more than offset the employment 
effects of the increasing tradability of services. We could not peg the trend in the share of employment 
that is de facto tradable. That share has quite possibly increased as trade rules liberalized, despite the 
structural trends just enumerated. However, as trade restrictions are now quite limited, levels and 
trends in de facto and intrinsically tradable employment are likely to be more similar in future. Our 
results therefore suggest that for the foreseeable future, no more than 40% of any country’s labor force 
will produce goods and services that are internationally tradable. This has implications for exchange 
rate policy: the number of workers who are hurt by currency undervaluation is likely higher, relative to 
those that beneﬁt from it, than is commonly suggested.  
Finally, to examine the widely circulated idea that education and labor relations policies must 
be reformed to promote international competitiveness, we attempted to calculate the share of 
employment that is trade linked. To estimate this ﬁgure, we add estimated employment in intrinsically 
tradable sectors to the estimated amount of labor in other sectors that is directly auxiliary to intrinsic 
tradables. The upper and lower bounds on intrinsically tradable employment yield upper and lower 
bounds on trade-linked employment. This analysis is inconclusive with respect to trends in trade-
linked employment, indicating that the increasing reliance of nontradable sectors on tradables might 
be offset by declining employment in intrinsically tradable sectors. Thus, our analysis provides no clear 
support for (and no evidence against) extending pro-competitive reforms to more workers or sectors 
to cope with increased trade competition. Moreover, our efforts make clear three sources of ambiguity 
that make it difficult to evaluate such policy suggestions. First, trends in de facto tradability are not 
known, so trends in the trade-linked employment share are not knowable. Second, as is common in 
input–output analysis, the amount of labor demanded from nontradables to serve tradables can only 
be estimated on the assumption that output per worker in the nontradable sector is the same whether 
the service is sold to a tradable sector, a nontradable sector or a consumer. And third, the estimates 
only tell us something about education and labor relations policies if it can be assumed the workers in 
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nontradables that sell to tradables are distinct from those that do not. After all, one educates and 
regulates workers, not tasks, and without assumptions about how completely sectoral work is divided 
amongst workers, our estimates from input–output analysis can only shed light on the latter. 
Nonetheless, this clarity about the sources of ambiguity, and the structural trends in intrinsic 
tradables that we uncover do provide grounds for thinking carefully and perhaps skeptically about 
claims that globalization requires sweeping reforms to human resource policies. Scalpels may be 
preferred to brooms. 
 
 
 APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Estimation of Export-Induced and Trade-Linked Labor Demand 
?  is the matrix recording sales in nominal value terms from 35 producing sectors (in rows) to 35 
destination sectors in columns. Final sales of sectors to satisfy ﬁnal demand from 6 sources (domestic 
households; the government; nonproﬁts; ﬁrms—for, separately, capital investment and inventory 
accumulation purposes; and exports to the rest of the world) are recorded in the 35 x 6 matrix, ? , 
partitioned according to ( )? ?? ? ????? ? ?= , where ?  is the 35 x 1 vector of exports by sector. Gross sales 
by sector are recorded in vector ?  (35 x 1). ?? −  is a 35 x 35 diagonal matrix in which the reciprocals of 
the elements of ?  form the diagonal. Employment by sector is ? (35 x 1), which is partitioned into our 
16 goods and 19 services industries [ ]? ?? ? ? ?= . Leontief production functions are assumed in each 
sector, and the utilization of labor and intermediate inputs by each sector is assumed not to depend 
upon where the output is sold. The following calculations are then standard. 
The matrix of Leontief technical coefficients ? ??????? ??????ijA a i j? ?= = =? ?  is recovered by: ??? ? −= . Gross output is related to intermediate and ﬁnal demand by: ?? ?? ?? ?? ?= + , where ??  is 
an n x 1 vector of ones. Putting these expressions together yields ( ) ( )? ? ?? ? ? ? ???? ?−= − + + . The 35 x 1 
vector containing outputs of each sector linked to demand for exports is then ( ) ??? ? ? ?−= − =  
? ? ??????x iy i? ?=? ? . The amounts of export-linked employment in each sector are ?? =  
? ? ? ??????i x i il y y i? ?∗ =? ? . Total export linked employment in the economy is ? ??? ?′ . The estimated 
fraction of each sector’s gross production that is export linked is ? ?? ?− . This vector also serves as our 
estimate of the fraction of each sector’s employment that is export linked. For convenience, we label 
these fractions ??????λλ . The share of all employment economywide that is export linked is given by      
λ =  ( ) ( )? ?? ??? ?? ? ?? . 
Our bounds for intrinsically trade-linked employment are calculated as follows: Deﬁne a 35x1 
vector capturing the fractions of activities within each of our goods and services sector that are 
tradable: [ ]? ?τ = τ τ . Both bounds assume goods are intrinsically tradable ( )? ???τ = . The lower bound 
assumes no services are tradable ( )? ?τ =  while the upper bound estimates of services tradability are 
derived, as before, from the geographic clustering of US industries. In either case, total trade linked 
employment is calculated as  ?????? ? ? ? ??, where ? denotes element-wise multiplication of 
vectors, and each of the 35 elements of ? is given by ?? ? ???? ? ?? ? ?????? ???????? . The ?? ? term is 
simply direct employment in tradable sectors. The b vector is employment in nontradable activities 
that exists to supply auxiliary services to tradables: ????  is the amount of activity in sector i that is 
tradable, ??? ???  is the labor demanded in sector ? to make possible a unit of activity in sector ?, and 
?? ? ??? is a correction to ensure that only nontradable employment in sector ? gets added to the 
indirect effects. 
Appendix 2: International Labour Organization Data Cleaning Procedures 
We began with the full LABORSTA database, which contains information on the numbers of employed 
persons over time for 174 countries. In any given country and year, these data can include competing 
series of estimates from more than one source, and the sources may use different sectoral classifications.  
We culled and cleaned this dataset as follows. We ﬁrst kept observations collected according 
to the International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) revisions 2, 3, or 4, and dropped those 
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collected according to ISIC Revision 1. We then dropped series that exclude major sections of the 
workforce (e.g., rural residents, agricultural workers). In those instances where employment levels in 
some sectors were missing, but could be inferred from total employment and employment in other 
sectors (e.g., Spain was missing only agricultural employment in 1978 but provided data on total 
employment), we ﬁlled in the blanks and checked to see whether this yielded discontinuities in the 
series. Where discontinuities were observed, the series was dropped. Where the information needed to 
ﬁll in the holes was unavailable (e.g. the series based on Costa Rica’s labor force survey has no 
estimates for mining, utilities or ﬁnance between 1976 and 1978 and was dropped) we dropped those 
years, but not the entire series. 
After these adjustments, some countries still had multiple series. For these countries, we 
combined the series. When two series were available with overlapping years we opted to use the 
longest available series for those years, and use the data from the remaining years from the shorter 
series. If two series overlapped temporally and had the same length, we chose the one in ISIC revision 
2. If series did not overlap, we spliced them together and checked the total employment series visually 
for breaks. If the temporal gap between the two series exceeded three years, such a test was not 
possible. We then checked the resulting total employment series visually to ensure that there were no 
breaks or anomalies. Once the longer series were assembled, we matched all non-ISIC Revision 2 data 
and ISIC Revision 2. Finally, we restricted attention to the 67 countries for which the graphically 
consistent series spanned at least 20 years.  
For the People’s Republic of China (PRC) we use Census data from 1982, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2010. Data from the PRC’s Yearbooks are considered less reliable, particularly in their 
handling of migrant workers (Li and Gibson 2013) and don’t cover the rural sector post-2003. 
We have produced graphs of the upper and lower bound estimates of intrinsically tradable 
employment separately for all countries, and found only one country, Botswana, in which these series 
appear to display sudden jumps.  
Appendix 3: Intrinsically Tradable Employment Estimates from Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre Data 
As noted the ILO data are somewhat limited in their temporal coverage. The GGDC’s 10 Sector 
Database provides longer series on employment shares, typically back to the 1960s, and in some cases 
to the 1950s. While it only includes data on 42 countries, several of these are not in our ILO dataset, 
including 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This Appendix provides details of the country coverage, 
and graphs are available upon request. 
Results using these data reconfirm the impression of a decline in employment in intrinsically 
tradable sectors. In 39 out of 42 countries, the initial lower-bound is higher than the subsequent upper 
bound. This includes several countries that fell in the ambiguous category using ILO data: The three 
exceptions are Singapore, Nigeria and Zambia. In Singapore, the lower bound estimate declines over time 
and the upper bound estimate increases, leaving it in the ambiguous category. In Nigeria, intrinsically 
tradable employment declined from over 80% in 160 to around 50% in 1982 before climbing back up 
to over 70% by 2010. This V-shape was driven entirely by a dramatic rebound in Agriculture’s share of 
employment. Zambia is the only country in either dataset in which we see evidence of an increase in 
intrinsically tradable employment, which rose from around 70% to around 80%, driven again by 
agricultural expansion. However, as noted in previous studies (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo 
2014), the increase in agricultural employment in these two countries is exceptional.
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Appendix 4 
Table A4: Assumed Level of Intrinsic Tradability of WIOD and 1-Digit Level ISIC Industries 
WIOD 
Code Description 
Upper 
Bound (EU 
Countries) 
Upper 
Bound 
(Non-EU 
Countries) How we got this value 1 Digit 
Upper 
Bound 
(EU 
Countries) 
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable Agriculture 100.00% 
C Mining and Quarrying 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable Mining 100.00% 
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable 
Manufacturing  100.00% 
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
23 Coke, Reﬁned Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
25 Rubber and Plastics 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
29 Machinery, nec 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
34t35 Transport Equipment 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
36t37 Manufacturing, nec; Recycling 100.00% 100.00% Goods are tradable
E Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 19.15% 19.15% Jensen et al. (2005), Table 4 Utilities 19.15% 
F Construction 0.00% 0.00% Spence and Hlatshwayo 
(2011), Appendix II 
Construction 0.00% 
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles 
and Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
0.00% 0.00% By assumption 
Commerce 7.26% 
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
0.00% 0.00% Spence and Hlatshwayo 
(2011), Appendix II 
52 Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Repair of Household Goods 
14.82% 14.82% Spence and Hlatshwayo
(2011), Appendix II 
continued on next page
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WIOD 
Code Description 
Upper 
Bound (EU 
Countries) 
Upper 
Bound 
(Non-EU 
Countries) How we got this value 1 Digit 
Upper 
Bound 
(EU 
Countries) 
H Hotels and Restaurants 0.00% 0.00% Spence and Hlatshwayo 
(2011)  
60 Inland Transport 100.00% 0.00% By assumption 
Transportation and 
communication 45.83% 
61 Water Transport 100.00% 100.00% By assumption
62 Air Transport 100.00% 100.00% By assumption
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; 
Activities of Travel Agencies 
27.12% 27.12% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
64 Post and Telecommunications 72.58% 72.58% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
J Financial Intermediation 67.46% 67.46% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
Fire 72.61% 70 Real Estate Activities 0.00% 0.00% Spence and Hlatshwayo 
(2011) 
71t74 Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other 
Business Activities 
81.03% 81.03% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security 
0.00% 0.00% Spence and Hlatshwayo 
(2011), Appendix II 
Other 5.43% M 
 
Education 1.14% 1.14% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
N Health and Social Work 2.14% 2.14% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
  
Table A4 continued 
continued on next page
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WIOD 
Code Description 
Upper 
Bound (EU 
Countries) 
Upper 
Bound 
(Non-EU 
Countries) How we got this value 1 Digit 
Upper 
Bound 
(EU 
Countries) 
O Other Community, Social and Personal Services 27.11% 27.11% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
  
P Private Households with Employed Persons 0.00% 0.00% Aggregated using 
employment data and 
Jensen et al. (2005), Table 2 
EU = European Union, ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation, nec = not elsewhere classiﬁed, WIOD = World Input–Output Database. 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
Table A4 continued 
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